

INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON IMMIGRANT SERVICE PROVISION

Myer Siemiatycki and
Triadafilos Triadafilopoulos





MOWAT

APPLIED PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH
INFORMED BY ONTARIO'S REALITY

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The signing of the Canada-Ontario Immigration Agreement (COIA) in 2005 was a significant step forward in federal-provincial-municipal cooperation to support immigrants to Ontario and represents a significant achievement for both governments. The COIA is up for renewal in 2011 and an assessment of the first agreement provides guidance for a renewed and improved agreement.

The COIA differs from the agreements signed by the federal government with British Columbia and Manitoba, both of whom have been given more autonomy by the federal government to run their own integration programs. The Agreement also differs from the one negotiated by Quebec, which grants Quebec full control not only of settlement services but of selection as well.

Ontario has never considered pursuing a Quebec-style agreement, given that such an agreement would significantly reduce the role of the federal government in nation-building through immigration, with the two largest provinces running their own immigration programs.

However, Mowat Centre research demonstrates that greater control over settlement and integration services, on par with the agreements that the federal government has negotiated with BC and Manitoba, is both feasible and desirable. The upcoming negotiations and renewal of the COIA provide an opportunity to pursue devolution of these programs to Ontario in order to expand and improve services to newcomers and help them integrate and prosper more quickly.

In a companion paper to the present report, Leslie Seidle (*The Canada-Ontario Immigration Agreement: Assessment and Options for Renewal*, May 2010) examines the Ontario, Manitoba and BC federal-provincial agreements and identifies a number of successes and potential improvements that should govern the renegotiation of the next COIA.

The achievements of the COIA include enhanced funding for settlement and integration services, expanded programming, co-funding of Ontario Bridge Training projects, increased professionalization of the settlement sector, and the successful inclusion of the municipal sector. Some new programs, such as the Local Immigration Partnerships Initiative, have been particularly successful.

Yet problems, such as a lack of follow through on federal spending commitments, have emerged that must be corrected in a renewed agreement. BC and Manitoba have not experienced these challenges. The federal government has delivered on its financial commitments. More importantly, from a program design perspective, these provinces have developed innovative services that are tailored to the particular circumstances of newcomers. They are also better coordinated with the suite of other provincial programs that support integration, in areas as diverse as sport and recreation, early childhood education, family counselling, housing, employment, community mental health, and all of the various services offered through the provincially-run education system that connect with children.

There are also lessons to learn internationally. In this paper, Myer Siemiatycki and Phil Triadafilopoulos examine the role of sub-national jurisdictions in immigrant settlement and integration in Australia, Germany, the United States and Britain. They find that Canada has been much more active, sophisticated and forward-looking in its immigrant settlement programs, but that some of these countries are catching up in important ways. There is broad recognition that sub-national jurisdictions can more quickly respond and successfully adapt settlement programs to meet local immigrant and community needs than national governments. As a result, they see a clear trend towards devolving these programs.

Mowat Centre recommendations emerging from these research papers:

- Based on the positive results in BC and Manitoba, the federal and Ontario governments should negotiate a devolution agreement to the Province. This will allow the provincial and municipal governments the power to introduce and manage more flexible programs for newcomers that are responsive to local circumstances and are coordinated with other provincial and municipal programs crucial to integration, such as education.
- Should a devolution agreement be negotiated, the Ontario government must put the funds in a separate envelope that cannot be cut or diverted to other non-settlement programming, report to the public the results of that spending, give the federal government appropriate credit for its financial contribution and agree to leave its own spending on programs intact.
- Should a devolution agreement fail to be negotiated, the eligibility criteria used by the federal government—both in terms of which programs they are willing to fund and which clients they are willing to serve—must be broadened. Too many good programs and too many needy newcomers fail to fit into the rigid boxes imposed by the federal government. These criteria significantly diminish Ontario's ability to integrate newcomers and strengthen the Canadian economy. For example, temporary foreign workers and new citizens should be able to access programs.
- Greater accountability and transparency to the Canadian public is necessary, regardless of whether a devolution agreement can be struck. The federal government does not currently report on how it uses its money on immigrant settlement in Ontario or other provinces.

These policy recommendations fulfill two complementary objectives: strengthen the Canadian economy by ensuring that newcomers integrate and participate as quickly as possible; and support newcomers to Canada by providing better, tailored and more coordinated integration and settlement programs and services.

INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON IMMIGRANT SERVICE PROVISION

Myer Siemiatycki and Triadafilos Triadafilopoulos

CANADA'S WELL-BEING AND DYNAMISM increasingly depend on assuring we have immigration programs that work. Our immigration system is vital to our future growth, prosperity and quality of life. With the Canadian and Ontario governments preparing to renegotiate the Canada-Ontario Immigration Agreement (COIA), now is a good time to examine how other federal countries manage their services for immigrants.

Our best comparators are other countries with immigration trends and government structures broadly similar to ours. We may be able to learn from countries that, like Canada, have large immigrant populations and a federal system in which both national and sub-national levels of government have significant powers over policy development and delivery.

TABLE 1. IMMIGRANTS IN SELECTED COUNTRIES, 2005

COUNTRY	NUMBER OF IMMIGRANTS	IMMIGRANT SHARE OF POPULATION
Australia	4,335,800	21.3%
Canada	6,304,000	19.5%
United States	39,266,500	13%
Germany	10,597,900	12.9%
United Kingdom	5,837,800	9.7%

Sources:

United Nations. 2009. United Nations Development Program. Human Development Report 2009. Overcoming Barriers: Human Mobility and Development, p. 143.

Four countries that might shed light on Canada's situation and help inform our thinking about the renegotiation of the COIA are the United States, Australia, Germany and the United Kingdom. As Table 1 indicates, all of these countries, like

Political observers now commonly speak of a world-wide trajectory of greater decentralization of governance across multiple policy fields, including immigration.

There is now greatly expanded sub-national participation in immigration decision-making, signifying the depth of the new federalism.

Canada, have large populations of immigrants. In addition, their immigrants tend to come from similar parts of the world. More than 75 per cent of all immigrants who arrived in Canada, Australia, the United States and Germany between 1990 and 2004 came from developing countries, while 50 per cent of immigrants to the United Kingdom came from such countries.¹ All five countries face the challenge, and reap the benefits, of integrating immigrants into their societies. And all strive to do so in a political system characterized by power sharing between national and sub-national levels of government. Four of the countries—Canada, the United States, Australia and Germany—are classic examples of federal political systems. For its part, the United Kingdom launched a process of devolution in the late 1990s, moving from a highly centralized, unitary system to a new “hybrid” model featuring a measure of power-sharing between Westminster and the newly established Parliament of Scotland, National Assembly of Wales and Assembly of Northern Ireland.

Political observers now commonly speak of a world-wide trajectory of greater decentralization of governance across multiple policy fields, including immigration. As sub-national governments have taken on a more robust immigration role, there is now “greatly expanded sub-national participation in immigration decision-making,” signifying “the depth of the new federalism.”² In the case of the United States, for instance, the immigration field has witnessed a “contemporary revolution in state-federal relations” as decision-making authority has devolved from federal to state and local governments.³

Ontario’s interest in re-thinking the role of Canada’s provinces in immigrant settlement and integration is part of this broader global trend. A close examination of how this issue is dealt with in the United States, Australia, Germany and the United Kingdom should help in this re-thinking process. Among the key questions confronting Canada and, indeed, each of the comparator countries, are: What is the best way to deliver immigrant settlement services in a country that is marked by a federal system where power is shared among different levels of government? How much authority over this issue should be devolved to sub-national units? Certainly, Canada’s immigration and immigrant integration policies have been regarded as relatively successful. Still, a consideration of other states’ experiences may reveal both best practices worth emulating and errors to be avoided.

During the course of our examination, we were struck by how little research has been dedicated to comparing how federal states deal with immigration and immigrant integration. Settlement services have garnered far less scholarly and

media attention than other immigration-related issues such as newcomer admissions, economic performance, refugee selection and so on. Even less attention has been devoted to the mechanics and nuances of how federal states handle immigrant settlement. This paper begins to fill in the blanks on the subject and should help inform a federal-provincial discussion of how governments can best offer immigrant settlement services.

In the bulk of this paper we look sequentially at how the United States, Australia, Germany and the United Kingdom align intergovernmental responsibilities over

immigration matters. Each section concludes with a discussion of lessons Canada and Ontario may draw from that country. In the paper's conclusion, we address broader lessons that may be drawn from this study.

THE UNITED STATES

"Historically, the U.S. government has offered very little direct assistance to immigrants...Aside from special programs for refugees, there are few governmental efforts to ease the transition of immigrants into the host society."

- J. Lynch and R. Simon⁴

"States continue forging ahead with record levels of immigrant-related legislation."

- National Conference of State Legislatures⁵

IMMIGRATION POLICY BACKGROUND

Two truisms have long characterized the role of governments in the United States with respect to immigration: first, that it was a field of federal responsibility and, second, that once immigrants were allowed into the country, they were expected to fend for themselves, with little direct government support. In recent years, however, both states and municipalities in the United

States have become more engaged in immigration policies and programs. This intergovernmental re-scaling of immigration roles has largely been initiated by the federal government, through its delegation and downloading of responsibilities. The result has been a mixed record of continued systemic under-provision of immigrant services combined with some creative experimentation with new program delivery.

The recently expanded role of states and cities has been described as one of the most important developments in immigration policy in the U.S.

Through much of the 20th century, American immigration policy became increasingly centralized and devoted almost exclusively to the regulation

of admissions and the exercise of deportation. As Clare Huntington observes, "immigration law in this narrow sense has been almost exclusively federal, with no or only a limited role for state and local governments."⁶ Indeed, declares Michael Wishnie, "[u]ntil recently, principles of federalism in immigration law were relatively uncontroversial. Immigration and immigrants were an exclusive federal concern, and for more than a century, states have been allowed virtually no role in the construction or enforcement of immigration law."⁷ Nor did governments in the United States regard immigrant settlement services as a public responsibility. Instead, support for newcomers was left to the institutions of family, faith, philanthropy and co-ethnic associations.

More recently, however, the concept of 'immigration federalism' has increasingly been used to characterize the unprecedented multi-lateral government engagement with immigration now underway in the U.S. The recently expanded role of states and cities has been described as "one of the most important developments in immigration policy" in the U.S.⁸ It resulted, interestingly, from federal delegation of authority to sub-national governments. This came from two federal impulses. First, in 1996, the federal government called

on the states to assist it in limiting illegal migration, by empowering them to enforce immigration laws by withholding benefits and services to those unlawfully in the country, and by assisting in deportation procedures. A second motor of devolution has been Washington's desire to download social program costs.⁹ Decentralization, American states and cities have learned, can come with a price tag.

State initiatives on immigration have risen dramatically. In 2005, a total of 38 state laws across the U.S. were passed related to immigration. For the first eleven months of 2009, the number soared to 353 laws enacted by 48 different states. The best

known—and most contentious—state initiative, of course, is the recent Arizona law that gives state and local officials sweeping powers to interrogate and discipline persons suspected to be illegal. But this does not mean that sub-national governments are inherently more restrictive or punitive in immigration matters. Reviewing state initiatives across the U.S., Peter Schuck has concluded “the evidence strongly suggests that the largest immigrant-receiving states, as well as some others, are in fact more generous to immigrants, even including undocumented ones, than is Congress.”¹⁰ There is no reason to believe the same would not be the case in Canada's largest immigrant-receiving province—Ontario.

IMMIGRANT SETTLEMENT PROGRAMS & INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS

There is no national immigrant settlement policy or program in the United States, nor are there any direct bilateral agreements between Washington and any states along the lines of the COIA. Instead, there is “a bewilderingly complex system of federal-state relationships” in delivering a limited range of newcomer

services.¹¹ Immigrant services are typically delivered at the state level and are often based on *ad hoc*, short-term funding.¹² The evidence suggests that this approach falls well short of meeting even basic integration needs of immigrants.

James Lynch and Rita Simon remind us that immigrant settlement services may be categorized as both direct and indirect. Direct services are specifically designed

The evidence strongly suggests that the largest immigrant-receiving states, as well as some others, are in fact more generous to immigrants.

for newcomers and typically include language training, interpretation and translation, employment counselling and citizenship preparation. Indirect services refer to generally available public services and facilities that enhance the integration of

newcomers such as schools, libraries, parks, social services and medical benefits. While the focus of this paper is on direct service provision, it is important to also recall that states are now playing a considerably greater role in determining immigrant access to indirect services as well.

The federal government's role in direct settlement provision narrowly focuses on naturalization, refugee services and (partial) funding of language acquisition. Significantly missing is any attention to labour market integration. One of the responsibilities of the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) is civic integration. According to its website, the USCIS “...promote[s] instruction and training on citizenship rights and responsibilities and provide[s] immigrants with the information and tools necessary to successfully integrate into American civic culture.”¹³ From the vantage point of USCIS, an immigrant has reached the endpoint of the integration process when s/he acquires citizenship. To that end, USCIS holds citizenship orientations and monthly classes to help participants through the naturalization process.

And yet, Canada, for instance, has a far higher rate of immigrant naturalization than the U.S. Irene Bloemraad, the leading scholar on the subject, attributes this to the sense of belonging that Canada manages to instil in newcomers through an array of supportive government programs, including settlement, multiculturalism and public health care.¹⁴

Beyond citizenship classes, the U.S. federal government plays only a very limited role in the provision of direct immigrant settlement services. While a range of newcomer services are provided to refugees, ESL funding is the sole support Washington extends to immigrants. A 2007 study by the Migration Policy Institute (MPI) estimated that the U.S. federal government was spending \$250-\$300 million annually on adult ESL while the states were contributing a total of \$700 million.¹⁵ The ratio of non-federal (state, local and private) to federal funding for ESL varies greatly across the country: ranging from \$8 of non-federal funding for every \$1 of federal funds in Florida; to \$7 for every \$1 in California; to just 30 cents for every \$1 in Texas, Kansas and Nebraska. These differences between states though underline a more important point: compared to Canada, the U.S. spends very little on language acquisition for newcomers.

MPI has been highly critical of ESL programming in the United States, noting in a 2009 study that "there is substantial unmet demand for ESL services across the country."¹⁶ A 2007 study concluded that the need for ESL programming "dwarfs the scale and abilities of the current service system."¹⁷ In New York City, for instance, recent estimates suggest that only about 5 per cent of ESL needs are being met. Long waiting lists for courses are common across the country.

The lack of adequate ESL services has created a barrier to immigrant naturalization. A 2003 study by the Urban Institute found that 60 per cent of immigrants who were eligible for U.S. citizenship had deficient English

skills. In fact, many seem to have avoided even applying for citizenship out of fear of failing the English test requirement. MPI has called on the federal government to significantly boost ESL funding.

MPI has also been critical of the quality of existing ESL programs. Only 36 per cent of all ESL students in 2003-2004 succeeded in advancing to the next level in the six-level U.S. program. MPI has recommended a host of measures for improving the situation, including benchmarks for assessing program quality, better teacher training and salaries, a more flexible range of teaching approaches, and an annual report to Congress on ESL program performance.¹⁸

Perhaps the most innovative new approach to providing immigrant settlement services in the United States is the "Building the New American Community" (BNAC) initiative. Based at the community level, the program was a pilot project created in response to the prevailing vacuum in settlement programming. In the absence of a national integration policy, BNAC promotes multi-level government and civil society co-operation at the urban level. Funding was provided by the federal government, with the National Conference of State Legislatures as program partner. Rejecting a 'one size fits all' approach, BNAC encouraged locally-defined goal-setting and network-building.¹⁹

The BNAC initiative was launched in 2000 as a pilot project in three urban centres that have recently attracted significant numbers of immigrants: Lowell Massachusetts, Nashville Tennessee and Portland Oregon. Consistent with the community-driven approach, each centre developed its own priority focus: civic engagement in Lowell, workforce and business development in Nashville, and immigrant community capacity development in Portland.

Evaluations of these initial BNAC projects have been cautiously optimistic. On the positive side, BNAC is praised for promoting:

- locally-based initiatives on immigrant integration;
- coalitions of multi-level governments and civil society actors to meet newcomer needs;
- building immigrant community civic capacity and leadership; and,
- contributing to more welcoming local climate for newcomers.

Yet, without additional resources, the BNAC strategy cannot succeed. An assessment of the initiative called for:

- more federal funding;
- a stronger role for state governments in co-coordinating integration policy and programs, to be led by a new position of state co-ordinator for newcomer integration; and,
- greater clarity of multi-level government roles.²⁰

These recommendations would institutionalize the devolution of responsibility for immigrant integration to states. Along these lines, the federal government also recently funded new demonstration projects for immigrant settlement in Arkansas and Iowa.²¹ Each state received (a fairly modest) \$850,000 over three years to launch one-stop newcomer support sites called New American Centers. Funded by the U.S. Department of Labor, these centers provided mainly employment-related services to all immigrants, including job training

and placement, language classes and legal assistance. One evaluation of this pilot project concluded that the centers “had a generally positive impact on the economic and social well-being of newcomers in both Arkansas and Iowa.”²¹ However, after federal funding ran out in 2008, the centers became dependent on state funding to continue their activities, while the previously cited “Building The New American Community” has program been extended.

The United States today still lacks a systematic orientation to immigrant settlement. Notwithstanding the recent shift to more active roles for state and city governments in immigration matters, the provision of immigrant services remains inadequate. States and cities have found themselves enlisted by the federal government into responsibility for immigration law enforcement and contributing to pay for such limited newcomer programs as are provided (e.g. ESL). The U.S. experience reminds us that sub-national governments’ involvement in immigration must be matched by federally committed funds and resources, and that devolution should never be an end in itself, but a means of strengthening immigrant settlement and integration.

LESSONS FOR CANADA

- U.S. states and municipalities are playing a growing role in immigration. The federal government has driven much of this devolution by downloading financial and enforcement responsibilities to states.
- Devolving authority to sub-national governments without providing adequate federal funding is a recipe for inadequate service provision.

- The vast differences in ratios of federal and state contributions to ESL program delivery suggests that setting minimal national standards for immigrant services would be a useful federal role under devolution.
- The United States has no systematic strategy or programs for immigrant settlement. There are significant civic, economic and social costs associated with inadequate immigrant settlement service provision. A toll is taken on immigrant language acquisition, naturalization, employment and income.
- Researchers commonly recommend an optimal model of immigrant service programming that includes local decision-making; multi-stakeholder program development; community partners who are involved in more flexible governance and decision-making models; and flexible program delivery modes.²²

AUSTRALIA

“There is nothing random about Australian immigration... Immigration selection, refugee policy, multiculturalism, immigrant settlement and advocacy of a continuing migration program, are all under the supervision of the Commonwealth Department of Immigration.”

- James Jupp²³

“Canada is most like Australia in terms of its immigration history and the settlement services it has developed.”

- Millbank, J. Phillips and C. Bohm²⁴

IMMIGRATION POLICY BACKGROUND

From its days as a penal colony for British convicts, through its 20th century “White Australia” mission, to its present-day determination to attract the “best

and the brightest” from around the world, Australia has always had singularly clear immigrant selection policies. This clarity went hand-in-hand with well-defined roles for the federation’s different levels of government when it came to immigration.

Australia’s federal structure consists of a Commonwealth (federal) government and the country’s six states, two mainland territories and seven offshore territories. The country’s constitution defines immigration, naturalization and citizenship as exclusive federal powers. While immigrant settlement is not explicitly mentioned in the constitution, the Commonwealth government also plays the dominant role in this area. The Commonwealth Department of Immigration is responsible for immigrant selection, refugee policy, multiculturalism and settlement.²⁵ In that sense, Australia has the most centralized immigration system in our study.

Among our comparator countries, Australia has the highest foreign-born population. Like Canada, Australia admits permanent migrants into the country in three distinct categories: a skilled stream (who enter the country through a points system), a family stream, and a humanitarian stream. Labour market needs drive the bulk of immigrant admissions in Australia. Skilled workers make up 70 per cent of all immigrants admitted into the country, and Australia has recently placed more emphasis on language proficiency, employment prospects and assessments of applicants’ credentials before they enter the country.²⁶

Additionally, recent years have seen a sharp rise in the number of temporary foreign workers in Australia. The country has also increasingly adopted “policies of strict deterrence” aimed at asylum seekers. These measures include tight visa controls and offshore imprisonment.²⁷

In immigrant settlement, as well, Australia has proceeded with clarity and resolve. The national Commonwealth government regards settlement services as a short-term investment in immigrant self-reliance.²⁸ Unlike the U.S., then, in Australia immigrant settlement services are systematically provided by government, with the national government taking the lead role.

IMMIGRANT SETTLEMENT PROGRAMS & INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS

Australia has long enticed immigrants with generous settlement support. Perhaps because of its geographic remoteness, its demographic need for migration and its historic preference for British immigrants, substantial government assistance was an early ingredient of Australian immigration policy. Travel and housing support was commonly available to immigrants in the first half of the 20th century. During the 1960s and 1970s, efforts to promote the integration of immigrants produced a host of settlement programs, such as ESL training, settlement orientation, and translation and interpreting services.²⁹ Today, Australia's settlement services are funded and designed by the federal government and typically delivered by community and educational organizations.

In 2006, Australia's Commonwealth government adopted the National Framework for Settlement Planning. It is telling that the national government developed this Framework unilaterally without engaging in negotiations with the states.

The Framework's statement of purpose underscores the importance of national direction in guiding settlement services throughout the country. "The aim of the Framework is to provide a more strategic and coordinated approach to settlement planning at a national level, thus improving the ability of governments, service providers, community organizations and other settlement stakeholders to plan for the arrival and settlement of new entrants."³⁰ It assigns responsibility for identifying the needs of newcomers to regional field offices of the National Department of Immigration rather than to the states or municipalities. The goal of the Framework is "to gain a national overview of settlement needs."³¹ Indeed, one of the major goals of this new approach was to eliminate the variation in settlement services across the country by putting in place a more uniform, centralized system. The National Settlement Planning Unit within the federal Immigration Department now takes the lead in developing and overseeing all settlement services.

The Settlement Framework also stresses that newcomer services are short-term government provisions aimed at quickly making immigrants self-sufficient and

In Australia, immigrant settlement services are systematically provided by government, with the national government taking the lead role.

generating an economic pay-off for the country.³² This emphasis may well reflect public scepticism about offering special services or advantages to newcomers. Australia now offers immigrants three key settlement services: the Adult Migrant English Program (AMEP), the Translating and Interpreting Service (TIS National), and the Settlement Grants Program (SGP).

AMEP is a national settlement program that provides up to 510 hours of English-language instruction to eligible migrants. The program is available to family and humanitarian stream entrants, as well as dependents of skilled migrants, but not to the principal skilled applicant. The latter are presumed to have been selected because of their language proficiency; yet, as we will see below, research links non-mother tongue English speakers with labour market under-performance. AMEP is delivered by 13 service providers with learning locations in more than 250 locations across the country. Typically, these providers are post-secondary institutions and organizations specializing in language training. Impressively, language instruction is delivered in a variety of learning modes including: full- or part-time classroom attendance; home-based distance learning supported by regular telephone contact with a qualified teacher; and a home tutor option taught by a trained volunteer.

TIS National is the only settlement service that is at least partly delivered by the Commonwealth government directly, rather than through externally funded organizations. The program offers free translation services to certain groups in order to facilitate communication with immigrants. Groups able to access this service include healthcare workers, emergency services, trade unions, parliamentarians, local government authorities and community-based organisations involved in settlement services. TIS National has three services: telephone interpretation, document translation, and face-to-face translators.

The Commonwealth government established the SGP in 2005 after consulting with the settlement services sector and the state/territorial and local government agencies. It provides funding to non-profit community groups that offer a wide range of services for humanitarian and family-stream newcomers. The funding is based on specific projects, and the government ensures accountability by requiring the community groups to submit progress reports, financial statements and statistics on their activities. Most of the SGP funding goes to Migrant Resource Centres (MRC) throughout the country. These non-profit groups also receive grants from state and local governments. They offer a wide range of services, including care for the elderly, English classes for people not eligible for AMEP, driving instruction, housing assistance, legal advice and counselling services. MRCs typically receive project specific funding for up to three years, and renewal is dependent on national government approval.

One recent departure from the overall pattern of centralized control over immigration was the Commonwealth government's decision to grant the state governments a role in immigrant selection through a program called State Specific and Regional Migration (SSRM). Like Canada's Provincial Nominee Program, the SSRM allows employers, states, territories or municipalities to sponsor skilled migrants who do not meet the national points-based test, as long as they settle outside of regions that are designated as high-migration areas. These programs were launched in the mid-1990s in response to labour shortages in certain parts of the country. Applicants must be endorsed by the state in which they intend to reside and must apply for positions that cannot be filled locally. States can use a database maintained by the Commonwealth government to identify visa-eligible candidates. Graeme Hugo has suggested that the SSRM program has led to "unprecedentedly greater involvement of state and local government in the immigration process."³³ While the SSRM does give states some

say in immigrant selection, the number of admissions under the program remains a tiny fraction of all annual newcomer admissions to Australia.

Perhaps the most unique example of inter-governmental interaction concerning immigration in Australia is the annual meeting of Commonwealth, State and Territory Ministers responsible for immigration matters. Launched in 1946, the forum now goes by the name of the Ministerial Council of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs. The meetings provide an opportunity for different levels of government to share information and discuss immigration policy and programs. But it is not a decision-making body; its role is to act as a consultative body to the national Commonwealth government.

As the Council's press releases make clear, the national government is in command at these sessions. The meetings are chaired by the national immigration minister and a sizeable chunk of the agenda consists of briefings by the Commonwealth government to the states and territories. Still, the Ministerial Council provides a regular venue for wide-ranging consultation between the federal and state governments. Issues discussed at the most recent Council meeting in 2009, included: future immigrant selection planning, newcomer healthcare entitlements, newcomer services and priority topics for immigration research.³⁴ Potentially, these annual Council meetings could be a forum for a stronger sub-national voice in immigration matters.

In terms of its overall effectiveness, Australia's approach to immigrant integration has received mixed reviews. Lesleyanne Hawthorne argues that new admission measures adopted in the 1990s—including mandatory English-language testing, screening for professional qualification and the elimination of income support

for immigrants during the first two years after their arrival—have improved the job market performance of recently admitted immigrants. Her research contends that more skilled migrants are entering Australia, and they are enjoying higher employment and earning levels than previous waves of newcomers. Hawthorne's research suggests that Australia's more rigorous immigrant selection process is bringing in newcomers who are better able to achieve economic integration into Australian society.³⁵

However, a study by Colin Green et al paints a different picture.³⁶ They found that mother tongue significantly determines immigrant economic performance in Australia. Skilled immigrants from non-English speaking backgrounds were significantly more likely to be underemployed than both English mother tongue newcomers and the broader native-born population. The researchers found that while Australia's curb on welfare payments to newcomers did raise their employment levels, it prompted non-English mother tongue immigrants in particular to accept jobs below their skill-experience set. As a result, Green et al argue that Australia is squandering its potential productivity gains from skills-based migration.³⁷

The 2006 Australian Census confirmed that non-English speakers are more likely to be unemployed and to earn less income when they are employed than their English-speaking counterparts. The unemployment rate for Mandarin speakers, for example, was 11.3 per cent, while the English-speaking rate was 4.7 per cent. Similarly, 58.5 per cent of Arabic speakers made less than \$400 per week, compared with 41.3 per cent of English speakers.³⁸ And there are other perceived barriers in Australia. The Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Australia in 2007 reported that 40 per cent

In terms of its overall effectiveness, Australia's approach to immigrant integration has received mixed reviews.

of newcomer respondents said they perceived “a lot” or “some” racism in the country. Language and race, then, correlate with adverse integration experiences for non-white, non-English mother tongue immigrants to Australia.

From immigrant selection to newcomer integration, authority over migration is highly centralized in Australia’s federal system. The country is our exemplar of national government dominance coinciding with a robust commitment to newcomer service provision. And yet, the evidence suggests that some newcomers fare worse than would be expected given their human capital profile. It may be that limitations on newcomer services are restricting the economic integration of non-English mother tongue, non-white skilled migrants. They are ineligible for English language training/upgrading, and labour market support is generally absent from newcomer services since immigrants are presumed to have requisite skills as the basis of their selection. Both selection and newcomer services in Australia are instrumentally geared to promote the host country’s economic advantage; both newcomers and the country could benefit from a more comprehensive investment in newcomer support.

LESSONS FOR CANADA

- National government control over immigration has facilitated the adoption of a National Framework for Settlement Planning.
- National authority over immigration has left little direct space for sub-national governments or community-based organizations to shape immigration policy and services.
- Restrictions on settlement services eligibility impact negatively on both those newcomers denied access, and the host society’s capacity to maximize the benefits of migration.

- Adult ESL training in Australia offers those eligible for instruction standardized learning time (510 hours) delivered in a variety of flexible learning modes (classroom, distance education and home-based).
- Australia’s annual Ministerial Council of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs is a potentially useful intergovernmental forum for addressing immigration issues.

GERMANY

“Integration is not a one-way street; it demands something from everyone in society.”

– Angela Merkel 2008.

“Integration policy is relevant to all political and social domains and it must, consequently, be understood and addressed as a socially comprehensive multi-dimensional challenge. This is true as regards different political domains, relations between federal units and the collaboration of state and non-state actors.”

– Maria Böhmer, Federal Commissioner for Migration, Refugees and Integration, 2008.

IMMIGRATION POLICY BACKGROUND

Germany is Europe’s principal destination for immigrants. The percentage of Germany’s population with a “migration background”—individuals who are immigrants or are the second or third-generation descendants of immigrants—is 18.7 per cent (15.4 million of 82 million). Due to the country’s low birth rate, which dates back to the mid-1960s, population growth in Germany has been driven exclusively by immigration.³⁹ Germany’s immigration-driven diversity is most evident in its large urban centres; the population of Frankfurt is 30 per cent foreign born, while that of Stuttgart is 24 per cent; Berlin, Hamburg, Munich and other cities

boast similarly large numbers of immigrants.

While it is clear that immigration has been important for postwar Germany, there was a marked reluctance about immigration in the country until very recently. Indeed, for much of the 1970s, 80s and 90s, conservative politicians insisted that Germany was “not an immigration country” at all.⁴⁰ This paradoxical position had much to do with the nature of postwar migration to Germany.⁴¹ The growth of Germany’s foreign-born population after the war was driven by temporary foreign workers, who helped fuel the country’s postwar “economic miracle”, as well as later increases in flows of asylum seekers and ethnic German repatriates during the 1980s and 1990s.⁴²

While refugees and especially ethnic German repatriates enjoyed some settlement assistance, Germany had no “integration policy” to speak of for the millions of temporary foreign workers who had become de facto immigrants, although they did enjoy social rights on a par with native Germans.⁴³ This began to change in the late 1990s, when Chancellor Gerhard Schröder’s cabinet acknowledged that Germany had been transformed by immigration and pledged to modernize the Federal Republic’s citizenship law. The government brought in a reform that introduced the concept of *jus soli* into Germany’s nationality law, granting citizenship to children born in the country to legally resident foreigners.⁴⁴

The government also introduced a new immigration law that became known as the Residence Act after it came into effect in 2005. Under this law, the federal government pledged to support the integration of legally resident foreigners. The Act also called for the introduction of “integration courses” to impart “adequate knowledge of the [German] language” and information regarding Germany’s “legal system, culture and history.” The integration courses would be coordinated and delivered through the new Federal Office for Migration and Refugees in conjunction with civil society organizations and state and local governments.⁴⁵

The Residence Act also called for the federal government to develop additional integration measures organized by the federal and state governments, particularly with regard to civic education and “migration-specific counselling services.” The Act called for the development of a nationwide integration plan that would systematically bring together all existing integration measures being carried out by all levels of government and

The Residence Act also called for the federal government to develop additional integration measures organized by the federal and state governments.

The German government pledged to support the integration of legally resident foreigners.

non-governmental organizations.

In short, the haphazard approach to settlement and integration that had emerged out of the guest worker period was to be carefully evaluated and reformed, with an eye to better coordinating the work of the federal, state and municipal governments and civil society organizations. In keeping with the German tradition of federalism, the federal government would (belatedly) take the lead in policy formulation, while recognizing the role of states and municipalities in implementing new policies.

The German government would (belatedly) take the lead in policy formulation, while recognizing the role of states and municipalities in implementing new policies.

IMMIGRANT SETTLEMENT PROGRAMS & INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS

The Residence Act succeeded in making immigrant integration an important part of the federal government's agenda. The issue was to gain even more prominence after the 2005 election, which brought to power a Grand Coalition of the Social Democrats and Christian Democrats. This coalition dampened the ideological differences between left and right, allowing for a more "pragmatic" approach to the integration of immigrants.

Integration policy was also pushed onto the agenda by the 9/11 attacks and Madrid and London bombings, which focused attention on radicalized immigrant youth and so-called "home-grown" terrorists. Added to this were the 2005 riots in the Paris suburbs, which raised fears of anarchic violence perpetrated by unemployed and angry young immigrant men. There were concerns of domestic origin, too. For one, Germany's results in the OECD's Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) were poor and there were persistently high unemployment rates among the country's second-generation immigrant youth. The consequences of inaction and the problems at home seemed clear. Moreover, several state governments were already moving ahead with comprehensive positions on integration policy, including Hamburg, North Rhine Westphalia and Lower Saxony. All things considered, the stage seemed set for rapid and far-reaching changes in policy at the federal level as well.

Among the Grand Coalition government's first steps was the organization of a National Integration Summit, hosted by the Chancellor, Angel Merkel. This high-profile event drew together representatives of the federal, state and local governments, alongside civil society groups and representatives of migrant-based organizations. The outcome of the Summit was a 200-

page National Integration Plan containing 400 recommendations, which was presented at a second summit in 2007.⁴⁶ Each level of government committed itself to fulfilling a number of objectives.

The federal government's obligations included:

- Improving the content and range of the integration courses, with an eye to better tailoring them to meet the needs of particular clienteles, such as youth, mothers of young children, and illiterate participants
- Increasing the number of "full-day" schools and childcare options available to immigrants through consultations with the state governments and local authorities
- Reducing the drop-out rate of students with a migration background
- Providing expanded opportunities for vocational training through programs developed in conjunction with private firms to young people with a migration background

State governments' obligations included:

- Providing more opportunities for German-language learning for school-age children
- Recruiting more teachers with a migration background
- Offering special support for employment-related language courses at vocational schools
- Improving migrants' access to health and social services
- Increasing funding for schools with large numbers of migrant students

Municipalities committed to:

- Making integration a cross-cutting, interdepartmental responsibility
- Enacting policies of “intercultural opening” by hiring more staff with a migration background and adapting services to meet the special needs of immigrant residents
- Enhancing the participation of migrant organizations in municipal-level policy formulation and implementation through consistent and meaningful consultation
- Creating targeted programs for neighbourhoods with particularly pressing needs

For their part, migrant organizations committed themselves to:

- Advancing programs dedicated to gender equality
- Developing programs aimed at encouraging children to do well in school

The plan also called for commitments on the part of the business sector, foundations and non-profit institutions, and the German media. Even the German Olympic Sport Federation and German Football Association were called on to play a role.

The federal government pledged to provide 750 million Euros to help meet the objectives laid down in the plan. It also promised further support for special programs developed by migrant organizations, private actors and sports associations.

Integration courses are at the heart of Germany’s new approach. The courses are meant for both new migrants and long settled foreign residents. Integration courses are made up of 900 hours of language instruction and 45 hours of “civics” lessons, focusing on Germany’s legal framework, history and culture. An exam is held at the end of the process. Immigrants who pass the exam are awarded a permanent residency permit and a reduction in the residency period required for naturalization.⁴⁷

“Third-country nationals,” meaning immigrants from non-EU states, are *obliged* to take part in integration courses if (1) they are not able to communicate in German orally on a simple level, (2) they receive unemployment benefits, or (3) they are deemed to have a “special need for integration.” Refusal to comply with a request to take part in integration courses—even by long-settled residents—may result in the denial of residency permit extensions and cuts to unemployment benefits.

A recent report by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees notes that approximately half a million newcomers have taken part in the integration courses since 2005.⁴⁸ In 2008, more than half of the individuals who completed the integration course passed the language test (37,438 people), marking a 6.8 per cent increase over the previous year. Compared to 2007, the number of exam takers also increased in 2008 by 39.2 per cent, to the current figure of 61,025 people. In total, the number of course participants (121,275) and course completers (73,557) has increased.

Less positively, the report also points to the need for improvement in certain areas that will sound familiar to Canadians, such as integrating foreign trained professionals into the German labor market and enhancing the active participation of immigrants in municipal affairs and administration.

Cities have taken some steps to deal with these issues. Stuttgart, for instance, has used support from the federal government to build on existing programs aimed at enhancing the local administration's "intercultural competence" by recruiting bi-lingual and multi-lingual staff.⁴⁹ The city also provides interpreting and translation services to immigrants with poor German language skills, and prints leaflets and informational brochures

The Socially Integrative Cities program has allowed German cities to adapt their services to meet the needs of immigrants. This positive experience points to the benefits of extending and deepening Canada's Local Immigration Partnership (LIP) initiative.

in several languages. As well, municipal employees are given training to improve their ability to "react more sensitively to intercultural contexts." These initiatives, and others like them in a number of German cities, have received support from the federal-state (*Bund-Länder*) Socially Integrative Cities program.⁵⁰ The program supports links between state and municipal actors, non-governmental service providers, and employers.

In sum, Germany has gone from denying its status as an immigration country and neglecting the needs of immigrants to developing and implementing an impressive range of programs linking the federal, state and local governments along with settlement service providers and other civil society actors. Integration courses serve as the core element in Germany's new approach to newcomer settlement. While it is too early to judge the overall success of these programs, their availability to both newly admitted and long-settled immigrants marks a noteworthy innovation. Furthermore, the degree of

commitment demonstrated by the Chancellor is distinctive; granting integration such high status on the public policy agenda has allowed for an impressive degree of cooperation among levels of government.

LESSONS FOR CANADA

- The high-profile leadership of the Chancellor at the National Integration Summits has helped place immigrant integration among the top public policy issues in Germany, and such high profile activities might be useful in Canada.
- Germany's approach to language training involves an active role on the part of the federal government in setting standards and evaluating outcomes; through the National Integration Summits, state governments have been able to propose additions to the range of training options, thus allowing for the evolution of programs.
- Although it is controversial, Germany's demand that even long-settled immigrants enrol in integration courses where such training is deemed necessary recognizes that integration is not simply a consequence of time spent in a country; Canadian governments might also consider offering language training based on immigrants' need, regardless of their immigration status.
- The Socially Integrative Cities program has allowed German cities to adapt their services to meet the needs of immigrants. This positive experience points to the benefits of extending and deepening Canada's Local Immigration Partnership (LIP) initiative.

THE UNITED KINGDOM

“There are no special programs to facilitate the integration of immigrants in [UK] society.”

– J. Lynch and R. Simon 2003⁵¹

“And we expect that newcomers should not be a burden on the country which has offered them the opportunity to come and make a new life... This new pathway to probationary citizenship and then to full citizenship shows the clear expectations we have, as a society, of people who come to our country.”

– Gordon Brown 2009⁵²

“Our research found a markedly more positive reception to new migrants in the Scottish locations than in the English locations.”

– R. Pillai, S. Kyambi, K. Nowacka and D. Srisankarajah⁵³

IMMIGRATION POLICY BACKGROUND

There are few familiar moorings to the policy environment related to immigration in the United Kingdom. Long a net exporter of people, the UK is now a major immigrant-receiving country. Immigrants are now arriving in the British Isles from many different countries, and new cultures of migration have emerged. At the same time, Britain is now experimenting with new political institutions and the devolution of some powers to sub-national levels of government. Meanwhile, there is considerable unease among the public over the impact of immigration on British society. The British case offers a reminder that newcomer services and integration are significantly shaped by public attitudes to immigration—a point we return to in our conclusion.

Today, a new century has brought new immigration anxieties to Britain. Religious extremism and “home

grown” terrorism have raised alarms over immigrant values and integration. At the same time, the accession of Eastern European countries to the European Union has generated an enormous wave of migrant labour (mostly from Poland). In 2003, Polish nationals were the 13th largest foreign-national group in Britain; by 2008, they were the largest. Concern has grown among the British public that the country is incapable of controlling newcomer admissions, their access to public services or their adaptation to the British way of life. Respondents to monthly polls since the late 1990s have consistently identified “race and immigration” among the top three most important issues facing the country, and two-thirds to four-fifths of respondents routinely express a preference for less immigration.⁵⁴ This stands in marked contrast to Canada’s acceptance of immigration.

Beyond new trends in immigration, the first decade of the 21st century has also seen the UK experiment with devolving power from the centre to sub-national units. Specifically, this has involved a delegation of some powers from the British Parliament to elected legislatures in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.

Meanwhile, there is considerable unease among the public over the impact of immigration on British society.

But this is still a long way from federalism. The new arrangement does not create sovereign new orders of government. It does strengthen sub-national governments, but they remain dependent on Whitehall’s delegation of authority. The British Parliament remains solely sovereign. It could, for instance, decide to reverse and undo its commitment to devolution. Moreover, the British system of devolution is asymmetric, with Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland exercising differing powers. In each case the division of jurisdiction hinges on the distinction between “reserved” powers (Whitehall only) and “devolved” powers (delegated to sub-national legislatures).

In all instances, immigration and nationality have remained “reserved” powers of the central government. As far as immigrant selection is concerned, the distinction between EU and non-EU citizens is, of course,

There hasn’t been a national immigrant integration strategy or any kind of national strategy.

have adopted a framework very similar to Canada’s approach. In addition to separate rules for asylum seekers and family unification, the UK structures its immigration system around the country’s labour market needs, using a points-based selection system.

In response to public concerns over the impact of immigration, the UK has recently enacted two innovations aimed at demonstrating that immigrants “earn” the right to reside permanently in Britain. The first was the establishment of the Migration Impact Fund in 2008. The Fund is based on the assumption that immigrants can have a negative impact on the receiving community by creating strains on housing or local services, and that migrants themselves should compensate neighbourhoods for such impacts. Newcomers are thus required to pay into the Fund at various stages of their settlement, including upon arrival and when they receive citizenship. Whitehall then distributes these funds regionally (based on immigrant settlement numbers), where they are awarded to local governments, institutions and non-governmental organizations that apply for support.

The Migration Impact Fund is expected to raise about 35 million pounds each year. To date, a wide range of services have been supported from the Fund, including enhanced enforcement of housing and labor standards, local neighborhood improvement projects and the enhanced provision of newcomer services. The goal is

critical. The former enjoy unrestricted labour mobility rights within the EU, including Britain. For non-EU citizens, the British

to provide—and demonstrate—tangible benefits to the host society in exchange for receiving newcomers. Projects are eligible for funding if they contribute to managing pressures on public services and expenditures identified with newcomer arrivals.⁵⁵

A more dramatic reflection of Britain’s resolve to have immigrants demonstrably earn their way into permanent settlement is the new citizenship protocol passed in 2009. The new approach adds a probationary citizenship period to the residency requirement, before naturalization is completed. Newcomers will be required to reside in Britain for five years and then go through a so-called probationary citizenship period of between one to three years before acquiring full British citizenship.

Under this new regime of “earned citizenship,” immigrants will be required to prove their suitability to live in Britain by

This has left space for local authorities to create their own immigrant integration programs.

acquiring adequate English proficiency, paying taxes and becoming self-sufficient, obeying the law, joining the “British way of life” and demonstrating “active citizenship.” This last category will require newcomers to participate in volunteer activity at a recognized charity or community organization.⁵⁶ Immigrants who fail to successfully complete the probationary citizenship phase will be required—in the words of outgoing British Prime Minister Gordon Brown—to “go home.”⁵⁷

The integration of immigrants in Britain seems increasingly framed, then, by the way their presence in the country is seen as a problem to be managed.

IMMIGRANT SETTLEMENT PROGRAMS & INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS

Britain has never had a coherent national program of immigrant settlement. Lynch and Simon have noted, for

instance, the absence of newcomer employment support programs and the minimal central government funding for newcomer English language instruction, resulting in only “spotty” provision of language education for immigrants.⁵⁸ They attributed this service void to government fears of a voter backlash against public spending deemed too generous to immigrants.⁵⁹

Unlike Germany, Britain’s immigrant service landscape remains largely barren and uncultivated. As British immigration scholar Will Somerville stated in an interview for this research, “there hasn’t been a national immigrant integration strategy [or] any kind of national strategy.”⁶⁰ This has left space for local authorities to create their own immigrant integration programs. Ian Kernoghan, a senior immigration official with the Scottish government, stated in an interview for this research that “each of the local authorities tend to do their own thing depending on the numbers of migrants that they have and depending on the concentration of those migrants.”⁶¹

A closer look at the Scottish example is instructive. Scotland is a relatively small, aging society of five million people with nationalist aspirations. It has recently experienced large EU labour migration from Eastern Europe, and more generally looks to immigration to buttress its demographics and vitality. Under devolution the Scottish government, through its parliament, has acquired powers in more than a dozen fields, including education and training, health, local government, housing and social work.⁶² Since a number of those fields intersect with the specific needs of newcomers, the Scottish government has pro-actively introduced a variety of integration initiatives. Foremost among these has been its commitment to support English-language instruction. In 2007, the Scottish parliament adopted a strategy for enhancing the English language skills of adult immigrants. The strategy’s vision statement reflects Scotland’s pro-active, inclusive ethos of immigrant integration, declaring that:

all Scottish residents for whom English is not a first language have the opportunity to access high quality English language provision so that they can acquire the language skills to enable them to participate in Scottish life: in the workplace, through further study, within the family, the local community, Scottish society and the economy. These language skills are central to giving people a democratic voice and supporting them to contribute to the society in which they live.⁶³

Recognizing a “significant unmet demand” for English-language instruction, the Scottish government provides financing for dozens of local education and community organizations that deliver English-language training to immigrants. Nevertheless, the funding available is a rather modest 3 million pounds per year.⁶⁴

The Scottish government also works through its 32 municipal authorities to deliver a wider range of immigrant supports. But Kernoghan describes the provision of services across Scotland as “a patchwork.”⁶⁵ A recent study of immigrant integration at 10 sites across England and Scotland concluded that immigrant services have suffered from a lack of systematic planning and co-ordination. Immigrant program delivery, the study concluded, has “very rarely been the result of a proactive and planned strategy to meeting the needs of a new migrant group.”⁶⁶

Nevertheless, the study found that the integration of immigrants has been more successful in Scotland than in England. “Our research”, the authors concluded, “found a markedly more positive reception to new migrants in the Scottish locations than in the English locations.”⁶⁷ This was reflected in more immigrant-friendly public opinion, political leadership and media in Scotland.

Indeed, differing attitudes towards immigration are now one of the sharper divides between the Scottish government and Whitehall.⁶⁸ Kernoghan puts it this way: “In terms of policy objectives, the broad approach of the UK Government is based on the premise that there is too much immigration and our broad approach in the Scottish Government is that we don’t have enough immigrants and we’d like some more.”⁶⁹

As a result, Scotland has been more assertive and inclusive in its approach to immigration. The Scottish government beckons newcomers with a multi-lingual website and declares the ethos of the region to be, “One

Scotland, Many Cultures.” And, interestingly, nationalists invoke immigration as an argument in favor of full Scottish independence. Scotland must assume full control over immigrant selection, the argument goes, so that it can open the doors to newcomers wider than the United Kingdom currently allows.

The United Kingdom is experiencing intensified immigration in a context of public apprehension and political devolution. Central authority remains pre-eminent in the immigration field and the British government’s approach to integration requires that newcomers demonstrate their commitment and value to Britain, while the country makes minimal commitments to newcomer services. In Scotland, frustration over restrictive British immigration policies is fuelling nationalist and autonomist claims to be able to deliver immigrant services better at the sub-national level.

LESSONS FOR CANADA

- Even countries with traditions of highly centralized government, such as the United Kingdom, are now experimenting with new devolutionary, decentralized arrangements.
- The absence of a coherent settlement services program in Britain has impeded immigrant integration.
- Scotland has shown that sub-national jurisdictions can take the lead on creative and innovative settlement and integration services in a manner that responds to their local circumstances and political culture. However, in the absence of more capacity for generating revenues, these innovative programs will remain relatively modest.

CONCLUSION

Our four case studies reveal a number of patterns and themes germane to Ontario's quest for a more robust role in immigration services and integration.

We begin with an important over-arching observation. Borrowing the famous formulation of von Clausewitz, we note from our international cases that immigrant settlement services also amount to "politics by other means." A country's approach to settlement services is not simply a technocratic, administrative or academic exercise. Most fundamentally it reflects the host society's belief of the place of foreigners in their midst, and more broadly the role of government in civil society.

Canadians consistently demonstrate considerably higher 'immigration-positive' attitudes than citizens of our four other case study countries.⁷⁰

Canada and Ontario have been able to leverage this public support to put in place longer standing and more comprehensive newcomer settlement programs than our four comparator countries. Conversely, anxiety over the impact of immigration in our four case studies accounts for many of the deficiencies and punitive measures in their immigrant integration approaches. Long resistant to regarding itself as a country *of* immigrants, Germany only recently launched a systematic, multi-level government approach to settlement. And in the U.S., Australia and U.K. framing immigration as a potential problem to be managed (e.g. concerns over inadequate border controls, spending on immigrant supports and the impact of diversity on 'national culture') has variously led to integration regimes emphasizing law enforcement, minimal government supports, newcomer self-reliance and demonstrable contribution to the host society. All this suggests that the commitment Canada and Ontario make to immigration, diversity and inclusion (through laws, policies and institutions) is a critical underpinning of immigrant integration; all of this suggests that the first COIA has to be regarded as a success and a step forward for collaboration on integration matters and an important source of support for newcomers to Ontario.

We turn now to more specific findings of this paper. First, all four of the countries we examined, including unitary Britain, demonstrate a trend towards devolution to sub-national jurisdictions in immigration matters. This has meant greater scope for sub-national governments in a range of areas, including: a) selecting immigrants for traditionally under-settled regions (Australia); b) assisting in deportation enforcement (US); c) legislating the social and civic entitlements of newcomers (US); d) setting the

Canadians consistently demonstrate considerably higher 'immigration-positive' attitudes than citizens of our four other case study countries.

Even countries with traditions of highly centralized government, such as the United Kingdom, are now experimenting with new devolutionary, decentralized arrangements.

tone/climate of newcomer integration (US, Germany, Scotland); and, e) most importantly for the present study, actively managing the delivery and funding of newcomer services (US, Germany, Scotland). Canada's devolution to the provinces is therefore perfectly consistent with emerging international practice as countries try to ensure that the government best able to deliver a service has the tools to do so and is accountable for it.

Second, immigration has become a field of tri-level governance in all four countries as cities also play an important role in immigrant integration. Municipalities are increasingly being called upon to deliver and co-ordinate newcomer settlement initiatives, although they remain distinctly junior partners, lacking the power, funding and resources to act independently. If the federal government devolves settlement services to cities, funding must come with that devolution—a lesson especially important to Ontario cities such as Toronto, Mississauga, Brampton, Markham, Hamilton, Windsor and Ottawa, which are home to some of the highest concentrations of foreign-born population of cities anywhere.

Third, none of these countries has codified their inter-governmental roles in an explicit bilateral immigration agreement along the lines of COIA. Instead, the current intergovernmental roles of national and sub-national governments on immigration either follow the script of constitutional texts (Australia) or reflect recent intergovernmental realignments prompted by shifting domestic political influences (the US and UK). Germany's National Integration Plan stands as something of a hybrid in this regard, as it commits all three levels of government to fulfilling mutually agreed upon obligations, backed by federal government funding, without being a formal intergovernmental agreement. Canada, for its part, has a distinctive practice of bilateral federal-provincial immigration agreements establishing clear lines of

intergovernmental responsibility. However, these formal agreements should be sufficiently flexible to also permit experimentation in newcomer service management and 'evolution by doing' in program delivery. In this fashion devolution may emerge from both the text on an agreement page and the practice on the ground.

Fourth, the four countries examined have very different levels of commitment to newcomer services and, when compared to other countries, Canada has done a relatively good job of funding integration services and showing proactive leadership on settlement services. In all four of our case studies, the central government sets the tone. In Australia and Germany, a relatively robust regime of newcomer services results from pro-active central initiatives. Both countries have national integration policy frameworks. Interestingly, however, these countries handle control over the delivery of newcomer programs differently: as a central government responsibility in Australia and as a sub-national responsibility in Germany. Meanwhile, in the US and UK, central governments have been reluctant to directly fund newcomer services, and sub-national governments have lacked the resources and authority to adequately fill the void. Accordingly, it is these two countries where newcomer services lag farthest behind need. This suggests that a tangible commitment from the national government is critical to achieving effective newcomer service systems, which may then be operationalized in a variety of ways: under national, sub-national or shared control. The latter may involve national goals or standards, along with sub-national delivery and control.

Fifth, some of the promising service delivery models we identified (BNAC in the U.S. and recent German initiatives) actively involve the engagement of immigrant communities and organizations at the urban scale. This has long been a feature of Canada's settlement delivery system, with its reliance on program delivery by community agencies. This orientation stands to be further

reinforced by the new Local Immigration Partnership (LIP) initiative of the federal government.

Sixth, it is not by coincidence that of our four comparators, the two countries with better settlement programming (Australia and Germany) both convene domestic, multi-level government conferences on immigrant integration. Similar gatherings in Canada bringing together Federal, Provincial, Territorial and Municipal officials would have both symbolic and substantive benefit. Immigration issues would gain greater visibility, and regularized intergovernmental deliberations would elevate on the political agenda key issues like foreign credential recognition.

In the end, our newcomer services reflect the kind of Ontario and Canada we aspire to live in. Other countries have looked to us as a model of immigrant integration, variously emulating a number of our approaches including the selection point system, expeditious paths to naturalization, citizenship ceremonies, and multiculturalism. As multi-level governance becomes more commonplace around the world, the impending renegotiation of COIA is an opportunity for Ontario to model sub-national government leadership in immigrant integration as well. MC

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The authors are grateful for the contributions numerous people made to this study. Graduate students Caitlin Cassie, Sonja Friesl, Vanessa Goettler, Kelsey Norman and Alex Stoutley each provided superb research assistance. Joan Andrew helped us steer our research in a fruitful direction. Will Somerville and Ian Kernoghan shared their insights into immigration and immigrant settlement policies the U.K. and Scotland. Finally, we thank Matthew Mendelsohn, Shaun Young and Josh Hjartarson of the Mowat Centre for their invaluable support throughout the project. The views expressed in this study, along with any shortcomings, belong to the authors.

ENDNOTES

1. United Nations Development Program. *Human Development Report 2009. Overcoming Barriers: Human Mobility and Development* (New York: United Nations Human Development Program, 2009). P.J. Spiro, "Federalism and Immigration: Models and Trends," *International Social Science Journal*, 53, no.167 (2009): 67,73.
2. M.J. Wishnie, "Introduction: Immigration and Federalism," *New York University Annual Survey of American Law*, 58, no.3 (2002):284.
3. J. Lynch and R. Simon, *Immigration the World Over: Statutes, Policies, and Practices* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003), 33,38.
4. National Conference of State Legislatures, *2009 State Laws Related to Immigrants and Immigration* (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2009), 1.
5. C. Huntington, "The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration Federalism," *Vanderbilt Law Review*, 61, no.3 (2008): 7.
6. M.J. Wishnie 2002, 285.
7. C. Huntington 2008, 1.
8. M. Ellis, "Unsettling Immigrant Geographies: U.S. Immigration and the Politics of Scale," *Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie*, 97, no.1 (2006).
9. P.H. Schuck, "Some Federal-State Developments in International Law," *New York University Annual Survey of American Law*, 58, no.3 (2002): 2.
10. *Ibid*, 4.
11. A. Millbank, J. Phillips, and C. Bohm, *Australia's Settlement Services for Refugees and Migrants*, E-Brief 2006, <http://www.aph.gov.au/library/intguide/sp/settlement.htm> (accessed December 4, 2009).
12. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, "Educator and Volunteer Resources," CIS 2009, [http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menu-item.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgnnextoid=400b9ddf801b3210VgnVCM100000b92ca60aRCRD](http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menu-item.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgnnextoid=400b9ddf801b3210VgnVCM100000b92ca60aRCRD&vgnnextchannel=400b9ddf801b3210VgnVCM100000b92ca60aRCRD) (accessed December 10, 2009).
13. I. Bloemraad, *Becoming a Citizen: Incorporating Immigrants and Refugees in the United States and Canada* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006).
14. M. McHugh, J. Gelatt, and M. Fix, *Adult English Language Instruction in the United States: Determining Need and Investing Wisely* (Washington, D.C.: Migration Policy Institute, 2007).
15. R. Capps, M. Fix, M. McHugh, and S. Yi-Ling Lin, *Taking Limited English Proficient Adults Into Account in the Federal Adult Education Funding Formula* (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2009), 4.
16. M. McHugh et al 2007, 3.
17. *Ibid*.
18. Migration Policy Institute, *Building the New American Community: Newcomer Integration and Inclusion Experiences in Non-Traditional Gateway Cities* (Washington, D.C.: Migration Policy Institute, 2004).
19. *Ibid*.
20. R. Koralek, and J. Parnes, *Assisting Newcomers through Employment and Support Services* (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute, 2008), 28.
21. Migration Policy Institute 2004; M. McHugh et al 2007; R. Capps et al 2009.
22. J. Jupp, "Terrorism, Immigration and Multiculturalism: The Australian Experience," *International Journal*, 61, no.3 (2006): 1,7.
23. A. Millbank, J. Phillips and C. Bohm 2006, 8.
24. J. Jupp 2006. 3-4.
25. L. Hawthorne, "The Race for Talent – Comparing Canada, US, and Australia's Approach to Skilled Worker Migration" (presentation to Maytree Foundation/Institute for Research on Public Policy, Toronto, September 26, 2008).
26. A. Markus, J. Jupp and P. McDonald, *Australia's Immigration Revolution* (Crows Nest: Allen & Unwin, 2009).
27. Commonwealth of Australia, *National Framework for Settlement Planning* (Canberra: Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, 2006a).
28. A. Millbank, J. Phillips and C. Bohm 2006.
29. Commonwealth of Australia 2006a, 6.
30. *Ibid*, 7
31. *Ibid*, 4
32. G. Hugo, "Immigrant Settlement Outside of Australia's Capital Cities," *Population, Space and Place*, 14, no.6 (2008): 260.
33. Minister of Immigration and Citizenship, "MCIMA Communique. Canberra, Friday 14 August 2009," Commonwealth of Australia 2009, <http://www.minister.immi.gov.au/media/media-releases/2009/ce09073.htm> (accessed January 15, 2010).
34. L. Hawthorne, "Picking Winners: The Recent Transformation of Australia's Skilled Migration Policy," *International Migration Review*, 39, no.3 (2005).
35. C. Green, P. Kler and G. Leeves, "Immigrant Overeducation: Evidence from Recent Arrivals in Australia," *Economics in Education Review*, 26, no.4 (2007).
36. *Ibid*.
37. Commonwealth of Australia, *The People of Australia: Statistics from the 2006 Census* (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2006b).
38. *Migrationsbericht des Bundesamtes für Migration und Flüchtlinge im Auftrag der Bundesregierung. Migrationsbericht 2008* (Berlin: Bundesministerium des Innern, 2008).
39. S. Green, "Immigration and Integration Policy: Between Incrementalism and Non-Decisions," in *Governance in Contemporary Germany: The Semisovereign State Revisited*, S. Green and W.E. Patterson (eds). (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
40. All references to "Germany" refer to the former West Germany and, post-1990, to the united Federal Republic of Germany.
41. K. Schönwälder, *Einwanderung und ethnische Pluralität: Politische Entscheidungen und öffentliche Debatten in Großbritannien und der Bundesrepublik von den 1950er bis zu 1970er Jahren* (Essen: Klartext, 2001); R. Chin, *The Guest Worker Question in Postwar Germany* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
42. Y.N. Soysal, *Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2007), 2.
43. J. Ingram and T. Triadafilopoulos, "Rights, Norms, and Politics: The Case of German Citizenship Reform." *Social Research*, 77, no.1 (2010).
44. "Gesteze über den Aufenthalt, die Erwerbstätigkeit und die Integration von Ausländer im Bundesgebiet (Aufenthaltsgesetz – AufenthG)," in

- Deutsche Ausländerrecht*, 21. Auflage (Munich: Beck-Texte im dtv, 2008), 37-40.
45. Die Bundesregierung, *Der Nationale Integrationsplan. Neue Wege – Neue Chancen* (Berlin: Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, 2007).
 46. Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, *Integration in Germany: Annual Report 2008* (Nuremberg: Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, 2009).
 47. *Ibid.*, 6.
 48. A. Damelang and M. Steinhardt, "Integration Policy at a Regional Level in Germany," *Focus Migration Policy Brief*, no.10 (2008), http://www.focus-migration.de/uploads/tx_wilpubdb/PB10-integration.pdf. (accessed April 28, 2010).
 49. B. Reimann and U. Schuleri-Hartje, "Integrating Immigrants into Districts," *Soziale Stadt*, no.17 (2005), <http://www.sozialestadt.de/en/veroeffentlichungen/newsletter/integration-migranten.phtml> (accessed April 14, 2010).
 50. J. Lynch and R. Simon, *Immigration the World Over: Statutes, Policies, and Practices* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003), 134.
 51. G. Brown, "Speech on Immigration Nov.12, 2009", <http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/speeches-and-transcripts/2009/11/transcript-of-speech-on-immigration-21298> (accessed December 6, 2009).
 52. R. Pillai, S. Kyambi, K. Nowacka and D. Sriskandarajah, *The Reception and Integration of New Migrant Communities* (London: Institute for Public Policy Research, 2007), 34.
 53. W. Somerville, D. Sriskandarajah and M. Latorre, *United Kingdom: A Reluctant Country of Immigration* (Washington, D.C.: Migration Policy Institute, 2009).
 54. A. Bouras, "Migration Impact Fund," Government Office for London 2009, http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:TEPmbkZ5eHMJ:www.gos.gov.uk/497417/docs/289455/Alex_Bouras'_Presentation_t1.ppt+migration+impact+fund+london&cd=2&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=ca (accessed May 2, 2010).
 55. Z. Bhajee and R. Mann, "United Kingdom: Changes to British Citizenship Pursuant to the Borders, Citizenship, Immigration Act 2009," http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?article_id=97052 (accessed May 2, 2010).
 56. G. Brown 2009.
 57. J. Lynch and R. Simon 2003, 134.
 58. *Ibid.*, 144.
 59. W. Somerville, Interview: November 25, 2009.
 60. I. Kernaghan, Interview: December 10, 2009.
 61. M. Leeke, C. Sear and O. Gay, *An Introduction to Devolution in the UK* (London: House of Commons Library, Research Paper 03/84, 2003).
 62. Scottish Executive, "The Adult ESOL Strategy for Scotland," <http://www.esolscotland.com/documents/ESOLstrategy.pdf> (accessed May 3, 2010), 4.
 63. Kernaghan 2009.
 64. *Ibid.*
 65. R. Pillai, S. Kyambi, K. Nowacka and D. Sriskandarajah 2007, 27.
 66. *Ibid.*, 34.
 67. W. Somerville 2009.
 68. Kernaghan 2009.
 69. J. Lynch and R. Simon 2003; M. Adams, *Unlikely Utopia: The Surprising Triumph of Canadian Pluralism* (Toronto: Viking Canada, 2007).

About the Authors

Myer Siemiatycki is a Professor in the Department of Politics and Public Administration at Ryerson University and a former Department Chair. He has also served as Director of Ryerson's M.A. program in Immigration and Settlement Studies. He currently serves as Community Research Domain Leader at the Centre of Excellence for Research on Immigration and Settlement (Toronto). His honours include Distinguished Educator Award (Ontario Institute for Studies in Education).

Phil Triadfilopoulos is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Toronto, and a former Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC) Postdoctoral Fellow. Professor Triadafilopoulos' research interests include comparative public policy, international migration, ethnicity and nationalism. He is currently completing a book titled *Becoming Multicultural: Immigration and the Politics of Citizenship in Canada and Germany*.

About the Mowat Centre

The Mowat Centre for Policy Innovation is an independent, non-partisan public policy research centre located at the School of Public Policy and Governance at the University of Toronto.

The Mowat Centre undertakes collaborative applied policy research and engages in public dialogue on Canada's most important national issues, and proposes innovative, research-driven public policy recommendations, informed by Ontario's reality.

We believe a prosperous, equitable and dynamic Canada requires strong provinces, including a strong Ontario, and strong cities.

Visit us at www.mowatcentre.ca



School of Public Policy & Governance
UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO



525 University Avenue, Suite 820
Toronto, Ontario
M5G 2L3



School of Public Policy & Governance
UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO